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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTS ru:t KEV... 
ISSUE NUMBER I 
Whethrr ~ ;" ~ review;.: : :..:; is matter only f r.. • 
llv flrite -. .aCCxij.Cuw.v. . : and failing re review events and 
circumstances prior thereto. 
ISSUE ^Mr:^ ^1 
•Whether under the undisputed circumstances of -his c-sf • * •.-
Court abused its disgression • --- - • ._ _; _•_.„. 0.1. 
ali m o n y . . 
STATUTES , CONSTITUTION AND JURISDICTION 
... . - involves r review of the trial courts decision 
made and entered pursuant: tc 6 3r--^-t:r rt^v- Code Art ~ ~ !*- , 
and the effect *r-:~* ' . ...ion, v. -L isuic.c:. . s 
conieri -.. .  . - - . . . 95 3. 
... i^x*it:ii commenced t:.-> curr-r.: ,atte: oy , d^e-r 1 Show 
Cause in 1986 in Wasatch Court- The ~~r v-< 
Utah r"cur.r" \ * . . -:rJi«L:..i ^: the parties to 
incl. >J a Mc. 1- ~o /lociify, Paragraph . ./ ._; vedificari^r of 
Decree hereto for entered jui* Liiio ca^c u: , 
1976. 
The parties stipulated the evidence uhich resume? 
FindincG 01 r -, •- apprc"^ r- ; -' r <-: j;.::, . . -
croc ba^ -ed upon tne stipulated facts a_ 
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the record in the court file. This Appeal is from the 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree entered by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on December 10f 1952f and had three 
children of this marriage. At the time of this marriagef 
Plaintiff had two minor children from a prior marriage and was 
living on welfare. After this marraige the Plaintiff and her 
children of her prior marriage resided with the Plaintiff until 
their enamcipation and received all maintenance from the 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff commenced divorce action in Wasatch County on May 
27, 1964, Civil #2652/ which resulted in a temporary order of 
support and alimony. Parties reconciled and this action was 
finally dismissed by the Court in 1977 for failure to prosecute. 
In 1971/ Plaintiff again commenced an action in Wasatch County, 
Civil #3247/ which ended in divorce dated March 12f 1971. 
On the 8th day of June, 1976/ the above District Court 
entered a Modification Of Decree modifying the 1971 Decree. The 
modification provided in l.C: 
"Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and 
defendant is ordered to pay to said Plaintiff 
the sum of $75.00 per month alimony, said pay-
ments to be made to the clerk of the court for 
the benefit of said plaintiff until said plain-
tiff obtains work and receives gross income of 
$200.00 or more per month at which time said 
alimony shall be reduced to the sum of $50.00 
per month/ said payments to be made to the 
clerk of the court for the benefit of said 
plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of 
one-half of the amount of alimony due in that 
monrh on the 1st and 16th days of each month 
commencing May lf 1976/ and continuing on the 
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same days of each month until said plaintiff 
remarries, dies, or until the further order 
of the court, whichever events occurs first." 
Pursuant to said divorce Decree, all of the assets of the 
parties were distributed with the Plaintiff and the Department of 
Social Services receiving the bulk thereof. In addition, the 
Plaintiff was ordered to pay support for the one remaining minor 
child and alimony for the Plaintiff. 
That the remaining minor child was emancipated in 1981. 
Defendant paid all support and alimony as ordered by the 
Court until November, 1985, at which point he became disabled and 
also at which point he learned that the Plaintiff was receiving 
Social Security disability payments and had been since January of 
1985. 
The Court found that the Defendant's gross earning have 
dropped from $36,000.00 per year, at the time of modification in 
1976, to approximately $1,300.00 per month at the present. That 
during the marriage the parties gross income never exceeded 
$15,000.00 per year. 
The Court further found that the Defendant's retirement 
income was principally due to efforts made by him after the 
divorce Decree was entered by going to school, learning a trade, 
qualifying as an operator, and pursuing such training until his 
disability in 1985. 
The Courr further found that the Plaintiff had never 
maintined employment since the marriage or since the divorce 
except for brief short periods and has never provided the 
financial resources to support herself or her family since this 
marriage - always electing to receive public assistance. The 
Court found a material change of circumstances and ordered a 
reduction in alimony but declined to terminate alimony 
completely, electing to review the facts in comparison with 1976 
modification only and refusing to review events and circumstances 
from the time of the divorce. 
The Defendant has since remarried. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT NUMBER I 
The Court erred in reviewing circumstances only from the 
date of modification rather than to the date of the divorce. In 
reviewing dates and circumstances to 1976, the comparison was to 
circumstances accruing outside the divorce from separate and 
special effort by the Defendant and thus ignored merit of events 
prior thereto. 
ARGUMENT NUMBER II 
The facts and circumstances in this case merit a termination 
of alimony and the Court erred by failing to so rule. Alimony 
should never be 'til death due us part1 and, once all children 
have been emancipated, alimony becomes a penalty to the husband 
and a reward to the wife. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY 
FROM THE DATE OF MODIFICATION RATHER THAN TO THE 
DATE OF THE DIVORCE. 
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The Court erred by refusing to review events and 
circumstances at the time of the divorce instead of the date of 
modification. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether on a 
petition to vacate alimony the Court should compare present 
circumstances with time of the Decree or with the time of the 
last petition for modification in the case of Short v Short, 
(1971) 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54. The Court stared: 
"There is but one point on appeal: That 
the court erred in failing to compare the 
parties present circumstances in relation 
to those at the time of the decree. 
By and large in the ordinary divorce case the 
appellantfs contention would be meritorous, and 
the cases decided by this court sustain his con-
tention, " . . . and we base our conclusion here, 
not necessarily on any authority to the effect 
that the court views the facts in relation to the 
last petition for modification, but because the 
denial was not caprecious when viewed in the light 
of circumstances existing at the time of the di-
vorce . . . f ". 
When we view the facts in relation to the modification 
rather than the time of the divorce, it becomes possible to 
ignore the following facts: 
1. Due to Appellants efforts after the divorce, while Re-
pondant was collecting support and alimnony, he went to 
school, learned a trade as an operator, and pursued his 
trade until no longer able to do so. That because of 
his effort his present income is more than 70% derived 
outside of the marriage. 
2. The Respondant made no legitimate effort to obtain 
employment - electing to rely on public assistance 
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for about 13 years before any claim of disability and 
approximately 4 years thereafter. 
3. That Appellant didn't cause Respondant to become a pub-
lic charge, in fact he took her and her minor children 
of a prior marriage off the rolls and provided all 
their support until their emancipation. 
4. That her present income is derived from his Social 
Security benefits. 
5. That the Appellant has been under an alimony Order 
longer than he was married. 
6. That the divorce was the second divorce action com-
menced by the Respondant. That Appellant paid tem-
porary alimony during their separation. 
7. That Appellant is now remarried and has other 
responsibilities. 
8. That their youngest child was emancipated some 7 years 
ago. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ORDER AN END TO ALIMONY. 
There is great disparity in the rulings of the Supreme Court 
on alimony. Some cases have held that the length cf marriage was 
a factor and others have had held to the contrary. English v 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (1977), Frank v Frank, 585 P.2d 453 (1978). 
Length of marriage, ncwever, standing alone doesn't mean much. 
It can mean greater contribution to the marriage, but it can also 
mean greater endurance of the marriage as well. The more one has 
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put up with it, the more society will require. Tying the duration 
of alimony to the length of marriage is like the degrees of 
criminal offenses. If the husband puts up with the marriage for 
a month, it is a class B Misdemeanor; if 5 years, a Class A; if 
10 years, a Third Degree Felony; if 15 years, a Second Degree 
Felony (1 to 15); if over, it is life. 
Other cases have tied alimony to the wife's needs and her 
income or ability to produce-income. English v English, Supra 
Since everyone has needs, the effect on the payor is controlled 
exclusively on her income and ability to produce income. Thus, 
where we have a wife who will not obtain and maintain employment 
(everyone not physically or mentally handicapped is capable of 
employment of some type) she still has needs that must be paid 
for. 
Other cases have held that the purpose of alimony is to keep 
wife off public dole. When looked at from the defendant 
position, the husband is stuck unless she will support herself. 
If one is dumb enough to take a person off public assistance, he 
becomes responsible thereafter so long as he has capacity. 
Regardless of the wife's track record in prior marriage, the 
husband must bear the burden if the marriage fails and she won't 
support herself. 
Other cases have held there should be no alimony where the 
wife is willing to support herself. (Walker v Walker, 707 P.2d 
110 (1985): 8 year marriage (No Alimony); Workman v Workman, 652 
P.2d 931: (No alimony) 
Other cases have approved limited duration as reasonable 
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while still other are to the contrary. Turner v Turner, 64S P.2d 
6 (1982): 11 year marriage, 24 months; Bushnel v Bushnell, 649 
P.2d 85 (1982): 11 year marriage, 4 years; Warren v Warren, 655 
P.2d 684 (1982): 27 year marriage, 4 years; Holt v Holt, 655 P.2d 
677 (1982): 11 year marriage, 6 years; Jeppson v Jeppson, 684 
P.2d 69 (1984): 10 year marriage, 13 years; King v King, 495 P.2d 
823, 27 Ut 2d 303: 16 year marriage, no time limit. 
The over all view of the cases on alimony by the author 
leads to the conclusion that there is no consistency. If a 
person gets caught in a failed marriage, he may escape punishment 
altogether or do a life term; but the likelihood of a life term 
is much greater if one has put forth the effort to work and earn 
and especially so if the wife does not. 
The vast discrepencies in the decisions perhaps is a result 
of the nature of the problem and the rule of appellant review. 
The temptation of the courts to pass the financial burden to an 
ex-husband seems too irrestible and simple. However, it oftimes 
ignores the element of fairness. What is it that a person has 
done in getting married that burdens him (nor to his children) 
but to his ex-spouse for life, particularly a first marriage. 
(Perhaps for a second marriage, if he didn't learn better from 
the first.) When should alimony be a life sentence? Once the 
children are emancipated, hasn't the time come when a husband has 
provided all the required financial assistance for adjustment to 
their separate lives. When is enough enough? Isn't 17 years 
enough to demonstrate that she will not make a normal effort to 
get off the public rolls? Should the substantial discression 
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afforded a trial court be used to ignore when alimony should 
cease? How long after emancipation of their children should 
alimony continue? Is need the sole" criteria since those whc 
won't provide for theirselves always have'needs? When should a 
pardon be granted or time off for good behavior be given? When 
has he paid his debt to society? 
Since the decisions are so varied it is impossible to cite a 
case for limited duration without also citing cases with 
unlimited duration• The trend, howeverr nationally and in Utah 
does appear to be to limited duration (See cases cited above). 
Using language about reward or punishment doesn't seem to 
equate in any manner to the decisions of our court or to the 
effects upon the parties. Once all the accumulated assets are 
dispersed and the children are provided for, all alimony except 
for a reasonable adjustment period beyond emancipation of 
dependent children becomes a reward to the 'wife and a punishment 
to the husband. Worse still, it becomes an incentive not to pack 
one's own weight. 
-Allowing alimony as punishment and reward makes much more 
sense and at least can be equated with the seriousness of the 
offense. It has the added advantage in that it doesn't reward 
lack of effort and industry and punish for it. 
It is recognized that under the rules pronounced by the 
Supreme Court for Appellant review that great latitude is 
accorded the trial judge, particularly where the evidence is in 
dispute. However, here the evidence is not in dispute. See 
Wiese v Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 and cases cited 
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therein. The latitude of a trial court is often stated in terms 
of a presumption. 
". ^  . the trial judge has considerable latitude 
of discression in such matters and that his 
judgement should not be changed lightly, 
and in fact, not at all, unless it works 
such a manifest injustice or iniquity as to 
indicate a clear abuse cf discression." 
Wilson v Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977. 
The problems with such a rule where there is no rule is that 
the trial judge is correct regardless of whether he terminates 
alimony or doesn't. Without the perimeters for termination of 
alimony being identified it becomes a roll of the dice. A 
reading of the cases would seem to demonstrate that the court has 
not: pronounced the criteria for the duration of alimony or its 
termination that the trial courts can use as a guide. 
There is a need for a more rational criteria for termination 
of alimony and a ruling that the total picture can be examined tc 
determine merit not merely a limited time span. '-Til death do us 
part1 should not be a criteria of alimony and, particularly, 
after all children are emancipated. There should be some 
consistency in the burdens of marriage and the court is the only 
body able to affect that consistency. 
Our court (it is not alone) has turned marriage into a very 
foolish venture - likewise honest effort and responsibility. 
Hopefully this case can provide a forum for some rationalr 
consistent framework for the duration of alimony. 
Our Constitution requires that our laws have uniform 
application. Art 1 §24. When has any court in this state 
required a wife to pay alimony to her husband for life? Laws 
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that depend upon discression of the trial court and abuse of 
discression by the appeals court for reversal produce such 
disparity that they can have no uniform application without 
specific guidlines. That is why we get rulings of anywhere from 
nothing to a lifetime burden. The court should catch up with the 
trend in this country and view the parties to a failed marriage 
in a more equal posture. The courts rulings on alimony refute 
the liberation of woman and their equality and reflect a time in 
the past when society frowned on a wife working or having a 
business or career of her own - when society never expected a 
wife to attempt to carry her own weight financially, merely to be 
tied to the stove and broom. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in being able to close its eyes to the totality of 
the evidence and its merits has been able to ignore the 
fundamental principle of fairness and has been cast in the 
position of trying to decide an area of the law without adequate 
guidelines. In its dilema, the Court has erred in failing to 
consider all the evidence and in failing to decide when enough is 
enough based upon principles of societies value. This case 
should be remanded with instructions and guidelines on the 
duration of alimony and its termination. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
J0M L. CHIDSS^ER "-
^attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUMS 
~?URT OF APPEALS 
Amended Decree of Divorce 
and Judgment 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Modification of Decree of 
Divorce and Judgment 
Decree of Divorce 
Tertporary Order 
1 
Brent J. Jensen, USB #3723 
Attorney for^ Plaintiff 
One East Center Street 
Suite 211 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 373-7761 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWANA EGAN LEE, 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, AND JUDGMENT 
v. 
: Civil No. CV-86-893 
STERLING CALVIN LEE, 
(Judge Ray M. Harding) 
Defendant. 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before this 
court, sitting without a jury, on January 6, 1988, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and through plaintiff's attorney, Brent 
J. Jensen, and Defendant appearing in person and through 
Defendant's attorney, John L. Chidester. The Court having 
heard the evidence of the parties and the cause having been 
submitted to the Court, and the Court having rendered its 
decision in writing, which decision consists of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Paragraph I.e. of the Decree of Divorce signed by the 
court on May 18, 1976 and entered in this case on May 21, 
1976, be and the same is hereby modified as follows: 
l.C. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and 
defendant* is ordered to pay to said Plaintiff the sum of 
$50.00 per month alimony, said payments to be made to the 
clerk of the court for the benefit of said plaintiff in semi-
monthly installments of one-half of the amount of alimony due 
in that month on the 1st and 16th days of each month 
commencing February 1, 1938, and continuing on the same days 
of each month until said plaintiff remarries, dies, or until 
the further order of the court, whichever event occurs first. 
2. All other paragraphs and provisions of the prior 
Decree of Divorce shall remain unchanged and in full effect 
and force as they were before this modification. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgement against Defendant in 
the amount of $1,075.00 for unpaid alimony from October 1985 
through January 1988. 
DATED: 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
John L. Chidester, 
attornev for defendant 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIEY that I mailed a n accurate copy of the 
F ' 111 d i n g s : :!: F a :: t a i i d C :) n :: J u s i o n s o f I a "w a i I :i t I i • E? A in e i i d e d 
Decree o f D i vo r c e b y f ir st class ma11 r pr epostage pa i d t o 
John I Chide s t e r a t 5 J We s t Cent e i I :) D Box 143, Heber 
3 
2 
Brent J. Jensen, #3723 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
One East Center Street 
Suite 211 
Provo, Utah 84601 
IN THE FOURIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FCR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * & * 
IOvANA EGAN LEEf : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- : 
STERLING CALVIN LEEf : Civil No. CV-86-893 
Defendant- : (Judge Ray M. Harding) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before this court on January 
6f 1988- At issue was the defendant's objection to the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner's recommendation filed on November 24, 1987, 
2. Plaintiff was present with her counsel, Brent J. Jensen- Defendant 
was present with his counsel, John L. Chidester. That the court and all 
parties approved the presentation of evidence by proffer with evidence to be 
received if any proffer was contested. 
3. The court having thus been fully advised and upon a review of the 
record in the court's file, the court now renders its decision and makes the 
following findings and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court altered a Modification of Decree of Divorce and Judgement 
on May 18, 1976, which states in the pertinent part: 
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l.C. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and defendant is 
ordered to pay to said Plaintiff the sum of $75.00 per month alimony, said 
payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit of said 
plaintiff until said plaintiff obtains work and receives a gross incone of 
$200.00 or more per month at which time said alimony shall be reduced to the 
sum of $50.00 per month, said paymeits to be made to the clerk of the court 
for the benefit of said plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of one-half of 
the amount of alimony due in that month on the 1st and 16th days of each month 
comneicing May 1, 1976 and continuing on the same days of each month until 
said plaintiff renarries, dies, or until the further order of the court, 
whichever evert occurs first. 
2. Plaintiff filed a motion for an order to show cause on February 11, 
1986, requesting judgemert for alimony arrearage. 
3. Defendant stopped paying alimony in November 1985 when he discovered 
plaintiff was receiving social security benefits for disability in excasss of 
$200.00 per month beginning in January 1985. 
4. Defendant has retired due to disability. 
5. Defendant's gross earnings have dropped from $36,000 per year at the 
time of modification in 1976, to approximately $1300 per month at the preseit. 
That the defendant became disabled and has been unable to work since 
September, 1985; that during this marriage, plaintiff's income was less than 
$15,000 a year. 
6. That the plaintiff has never maintained enployment since the marriage 
or since the divorce except for brief short time periods and has never 
provided the financial resources to support herself and/or family since the 
marriage. 
7. That the defendant after the divorce was able to increase his earning 
capacity and increase his retirement income by going to schcol, learning a 
trade, qualifying as an operator, and pursing said trade until his disability 
in 1985. 
8. Defendant has remarried. 
9. Plaintiff and her two minor children were public charges prior to the 
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marriage of the parties and after the divorce of the parties. Plaintiff is 
unenployed and ner need has not diminished even with the benefits she receives 
froti social security which total $396.80 per month as set out in her Affidavit 
on April 20,1 1987. 
10. The disability paymeits received by plaintiff are in lieu of wages 
that plaintiff might otherwise obtain from employment. 
11. That the plaintiff and the defendsant were married approximately 17 
years before their divorce in 1971. 
12. That the defendant took the plaintiff and her children off of the 
public rolls and provided all the support for her and her minor children firm 
their marriage until the emancipation of the two children. 
13. That the natural father of the two minor children of the plaintiff 
from the prior marriage was under a support order, but the natural father 
never contributed in any manner to their support. 
14. That the plaintiff has paid all support and all alimony until he 
discovered that plaintiff's disability incone; that plaintiff has paid alimony 
since 1971. 
15. Based upon the above conditions, the court finds that a material 
change of circumstances has occured in that defendant's ability to pay alimony 
has been reduced dramatically since his retirement for health reasons. 
Fran the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LflW 
1. That the court only reviews the matter from date of modification to 
the present and dees net review events and circumstances prior thereto. 
2. In Paffel v Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined the purpose of alimony to be to enable the receiving spouse to 
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maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriaGe and prevent that spouse from bccming a public charge. Unfortunately, 
Plaintiff was a public charge prior to the parties1 marriage as well as 
subsequent to the parties1 divorce • 
3. A material change of circumstances has occurred in that Defeidant's 
ability to pay alimony has been reduced dramatically since his retirenent for 
health reasons, but Defendant still receives approximately $1,300.00 per month 
as inccme. 
4. Therefore, Defendant's alimony obligation should have been reduced to 
$50.00 per month effective January 1985. As a result, Defendant should be 
credited for $275.00 as excess payments until November 1985. 
5. Eecause Defendant has made no alimony payments since October 1985, 
Defendant is in arrears in the sum of $1,350.00 through January 1988, minus 
$275.00 credited for excess payments made January through October of 1985, for 
a total alimony arrearage of $1,075.00. Plaintiff is awarded a judgement for 
said amount. 
6. Defendant is required to continue to be responsible to Plaintiff for 
alimony in the sum of $50.00 per month. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
John L. Chidester 
Attorney for Defendant 
~r.^c 
-A ?-/?'/(• 
McCUNE & McCUNE 
George M. McCune 
At torneys f o r P l a i n t i f f 
96 Eas t 100 South 
P . 0 . Box 7k6 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 373-0307 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTI, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
LOWAHA EGAN LEE, and STATE OF 
UTAH by and- through UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STERLING CALVIN LEE, 
Defendant.-
Civil No. 32^7 
MODIFICATION OF DECREE 
OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT 
This matter came on for hearing before the court without a jury at 
made and filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows, to-wit: 
1. The decree of divorce heretofore entered in this case on &krch 25, 
1971? be and the same is hereby modified as follows: 
a. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the remaining minor child of the parties, Linda Lee, subject 
to reasonable rights of visitation by defendant as follows, to-wit: Defendant 
is given the right to visit and take control of said minor child one day a 
week on each Saturday, unless defendant's work interferes, in which event 
the defendant is given the right to visit and take control of said minor 
child on an alternate day to be fixed by mutual agreement of the parties 
at least 10 days prior to said change of day. In the event defendant will 
not visit said child on the regular day, defendant shall furnish plaintiff 
LoWana Egan Lee at least 2k hours prior oral or written notice of said intent 
before said day. In the event defendant fails to so notify plaintiff LoWana 
Egan Lee when he does not plan on visiting said child on any regular day, 
defendant shall thenceforth be required to give plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee 
at least 2k hours oral or written notice prior to his visiting or picking 
up said minor child. In addition to the aforesaid visitation rights, defen-
dant is given the right to visit said minor child at plaintiff LoWana Egan 
Lee's residence on each Christmas day. Defendant is also given the right 
to take charge of the minor child of the parties for a period of 2 weeks during 
July of each year or for such other 2-week period during regular school summer 
support of the parties1 minor child, Linda Lee, born January lo, 19^5 > said 
payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit /tof said 
plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of $50.00 each on the 1st and l6th 
days of each month commencing May 1, 1976, and continuing on the same days 
of each month thereafter until said child reaches her majority, dies or 
until the further order of the court, whichever event occurs first, 
c. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and defendant is 
ordered to pay to said plaintiff the sum of $75*00 per month alimony, said 
payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit of said plaintiff 
until said plaintiff obtains work and receives^Jrgross income of $200.00 or 
more per month at which time said alimony shall be reduced to the sum of $50.00 
per month, said payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit 
of said plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of one-half of the amount of 
alimony due in that month on the 1st and l6th days of each month commencing 
May 1, IS765 2nd continuing on the same days of each month until said plaintiff 
remarries, dies or until the further order of the court, whichever event 
occurs first• 
d. The real property of the parties is hereby divided and disposed 
of as follows: Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and defendant Sterling Calvin Lee 
are each awarded a one-half divided interest as tenants in common to the 
following real property commonly known by street address of 680 North 500 West, 
Provo, Utah, located in Utah County, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point on the East line of Fifth West Street, 
•• - ° -- - H A i»_i „M<: TT^^+U An° War- 9kn 
defendant and any sums due plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee from defendant. Said 
property shall be listed for sale for $35*000.00 and any offer for less than 
s3G<d sum shall be submitted to the court for its approval. The proceeds of 
said sale shall .be divided between plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and defendant 
Sterling Calvin Lee as tenants in common after all liens to plaintiff the Utah 
State Department of Social Services and others are satisfied and a.11 costs 
and expenses of sale including additional attorney fees of sale are paid. 
e. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is awarded the exclusive possession 
of said real property and home and improvements thereon for as long as she 
desires.until the sale of said property is complete and possession delivered 
to the new buyer provided said plaintiff pays defendant for his one-half share 
of the rental value of said property in the sum of $90-00 per month for each 
month or portion thereof said plaintiff occupies said premises following 
May 1, 1976. 
f. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and defendant are ordered to each 
pay one-half of the mortgage payments due on the real property of said parties 
commencing May 1, 1976, and thereafter until said property is sold and possession 
delivered to the new buyer. 
g. Defendant is ordered and he is hereby permanently restrained 
from in any way using or representing the street address of 630 North 
500 West5 Provo3 Utah 8k6019 or any portion thereof as or to be his mailing 
address or place of domicile and he is further permanently restrained from 
in any way coming on or in the premises of plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and 
fOI costs of court herein, 
k. Plaintiff the State of Utah by and through Utah State Department 
oiNSocial Services is granted judgment against defendant in the sum of 
$7*765-10 for accrued alimony and support through April 30, 1976, under the 
former decree which is yet unpaid. 
DATED this g <(A day of \ jt ^^-^T , 1976. 
a 
BY 3EE COUHT: 
**&<-*3)>\ 
District/Judge 
Attest: 
w 
&&S 
Clerk of the Court 
•  4 
' - ^ t y of Wasatch ) 
J in my office 
: : ^ : c - : J c o , r t t h , s f & 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LO WANA EGAN LEE, r 
Plaintiff, + 
vs.
 t Civil No. 32kl 
STERLING CALVIN LEE, t DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Defendant. t 
The above entitled matter came on regularly and duly for trial before the 
Court on the Uth day of March, 1S71* before the Honorable Maurice Harding, 
Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, 
F. H. Eutterfield. Defendant was also present and represented by his attorney, 
John Chidester. 
The parties were sworn and testified and from the evidence therein 
adduced, the Court made and entered in writing its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law herein: 
IT IS NOW Ff THE COURT KZREFf ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff, Lo VJana Egan Lee, be and she is hereby awarded an 
interlocutory Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Sterling Calvin Lee upon 
tne grounds of cruelty, said Decree to become final three months from date of 
entry hereof, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending, 
or uhe Court before the expiration of said period for sufficient cause, upon 
its motion or upon the application of any person, whether interested or no*c, 
otherwise orders* 
2a The Plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody and control of the 
h* The P l a i n t i f f i s hereby awarded, and the Defendant i s hereby 
Ordered t o pay to t h e P l a i n t i f f t h e sum of $200.00 per month as alimony and 
-support - u n t i l - t h e f u r t h e r -Crder-pf-_-the-Court^ the - same- to be paid- in- tvo—equal 
semi monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s of SlGCo00 payable on t h e f i r s t and s i x t e e n t h days 
of each and every month h e r e a f t e r commencing March 16 , 1971, u n t i l t h e f u r t h e r 
Order of t he Court9 
So The Court makes no d i s p o s i t i o n of the r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of the 
p a r t i e s i n the dwel l ing house l o c a t e d a t 680 Nor th , 500 West, Frovo, Utah 
County, Utah a t t h i s t ime . However should the Defendant f a i l t o pay t o t h e 
P l a i n t i f f the sum of S2C0.C0 per month as alimony and support as provided i n 
paragraph four above, t h e s e sums which are not p a i d are hereby Ordered t o 
become a Lien i n favor of the P l a i n t i f f and aga in s t the Defendan t ' s i n t e r e s t 
i n t he sa id dwel l ing house l o c a t e d a t 660 North, 5C0 Wes"0, Frovo, Utah County, 
Utah . 
6o Defendant i s hereby Ordered t o pay the fami ly o b l i g a t i o n s of t he 
p a r t i e s and t o save and hold harmless zhe p l a i n t i f f therefrcm 0 
7« P l a i n t i f f i s hereby awarded Judgment as a g a i n s t the Defendant 
i n t h e amount of $300*00 for a t t o r n e y ' s f ees fo r the use aid b e n e f i t of he r 
a t t o r n e y , F . K<> E u u t e r f i e i d , for h i s s e r v i c e s i n t h i s a c t i o n , and Defendant 
i s hereby Ordered to pay t h i s sum to F* H# Buu te r f i e ld* 
Dated and s igned on t h i s / "> "CT"day of March, 1971 . 
EY THE COURT: 
*1 
IT" | 
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W nm FOURTH JUOfOAt. DISTRICT COURTOF.THg STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FDR WASATCH COUNTY 
LOWANA CONNER LEE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STERLINGC. LEE, 
TEMPORARY ORDER 
Civil No. 2652 
Defendant. Racorc'cJ In 
JUDGMENT RECORD^ 
Book.... ?.... Paoe3L3.A. f 
This matter came on regularly to be heard by the Court, sitting without 
a jury, on the 15th day of June, 1964, upon the Order to Show Cause heretofore 
issued by this Court on or about May 27, 1964. Plaintiff appeared in person and 
by her counsel, J. Robert Bullock, of the firm of Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson. 
Defendant appeared in person and by his counsel, Phillip V. Christenson, of the 
firm of Christenson, Paulson & Taylor. Based upon a stipulation of the parties 
made in open court, it is now 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff is awarded the temporary care, custody and control of 
the minor children of the parties, subject to the right of defendant to visit witfi 
said children at reasonable times and places. 
2. That defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff as 
temporary alimony and support money the sum of $180. 00 per month, payable 
$90. 00 on the 1st and 15th days of each month until further order of the Court; 
provided, however, that for the balance of the month of June, 1964, defendant 
shall pay the sum of $100. 00 forthwith. 
3. That in addition to the foregoing, defendant be, and he is hereby 
and use of the Pontiac automobile of the par t ies , and the temporary use and 
occupancy of the home located at Provo, Utah. 
M 6. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the temporary custody and| 
6 
w II use of bunk beds, bedding, and other items of housenoid furnishings and furnitur' 
8 to be agreed upon by the part ies 
9 7. That defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to maintain the medical 
*-0 I and hospital insurance coverage which he now has upon the plaintiff and the minop 
children 
8. Except as modified herein, the restraining order heretofore entered bty 
the Court on or about May 27, 1964, be and the same hereby is continued until 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 further order of the Court. 
/ / 
26 Dated this / 7 ^ day of June, 1964. 
17 I BY THE COURT 
18 i 
1 9
" " ' ' - ^ ^ - ^ - f 
201| Judge 
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